



Positivism is a set of philosophical approaches that seeks to apply scientific principles and 
methods, drawn from the natural and hard sciences, to social phenomena in order to 
explain them. Auguste Comte (1798–1857) is widely acknowledged as the father of 
positivism. He argued that social research prior to the nineteenth century was speculative, 
emotive and romantic and as a result it lacked rigour and analytical reasoning. Unwin 
(1992) details that Comte used the term ‘positive’ to prioritise the actual, the certain, the 
exact, the useful, the organic and the relative. In other words, he posited that it is more 
useful to concentrate on facts and truths – real, empirically observable phenomena and 
their interrelationships – rather than the imaginary, the speculative, the undecided, the 
imprecise. What Comte demanded was the objective collection of data through common 
methods of observation (that could be replicated) and the formulation of theories which 
could be tested (rather than as with empiricism, where observations are presented as fact). 
Such testing would be systematic and rigorous and would seek to develop laws that would 
explain and predict human behaviour. As such, Comte rejected metaphysical (concerned 
with meanings, beliefs and experiences) and normative (ethical and moral) questions as 
they could not be answered scientifically. Like with most other ‘isms’ and ‘ologies’ there 
are various different forms of positivism. The two most commonly discussed are logical 
positivism based on verification and critical rationalism based on falsification.
Logical positivism was developed by the Vienna Circle (a lose collection of social 
scientists and philosophers) in the 1920s and 30s. Like Comte, they posited that the 
scientific method used in the traditional sciences could be applied directly to social 
issues – that is, social behaviour could be measured, modelled and explained through 
the development of scientific laws in the same way that natural phenomena are exam-
ined. Such a view is called naturalism and is underpinned by a set of six assumptions 
as detailed by Johnston (1986: 27–8):
1. That events which occur within a society, or which involve human decision-making, 
have a determinate cause that is identifiable and verifiable. 
2. That decision-making is the result of the operation of a set of laws, to which indi-
viduals conform.
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3. That there is an objective world, compromising individual behaviour and that the 
results of that behaviour, which can be observed and recorded in an objective man-
ner, on universally agreed criteria.
4. That scientists are disinterested observers, able to stand outside their subject matter 
and observe and record its features in a neutral way, without in any respect chang-
ing those features by their procedures, and can reach dispassionate conclusions 
about it, which can be verified by other observers.
5. That, as in the study of inanimate matter, there is a structure to human society (an 
organic whole) which changes in determinate ways, according to the observable laws.
6. That the application of laws and theories of positivist social science can be used to alter 
societies, again in determinate ways, either by changing the laws which operate in par-
ticular circumstances or by changing the circumstances in which the laws will operate.
The Vienna Circle significantly extended Comte’s work, however, by formulating rigorous 
analytical procedures centred on verification. As such, they sought to define precise 
scientific principles and methods by which social behaviour could be measured and social 
laws verified (the extent to which scientific theories explained objective reality). The mode 
of measurement they advocated was one centred on the precise quantitative measurement 
of facts (e.g. heights, weights, time, distance, wage). These measurements allowed the 
statistical testing of relationships between variables as a means to test (verify) explanatory 
laws. Because the method focuses on known facts that are easily collected across large 
populations (e.g. using the census), it is possible to test and verify laws against very large 
sample sizes. Here, a deductive approach is employed, wherein a theory is formulated and 
hypotheses are set and then tested. In cases where the data does not support the 
hypotheses, the theory can be modified, new hypotheses set and the data re-analysed. A 
cumulative process is thus adopted, wherein theories are extended and built up in a 
structured and systematic manner through the incorporation of new findings and the 
rejection and resetting of hypotheses. Given that samples are often not perfect, complete 
verification is understood to be impossible, and logical positivism thus deals with weakly 
verified statements understood in terms of probabilities (the statistical likelihood of 
occurrence) that it aims to strengthen (Johnston 1986). By increasing the strength of 
probability that a relationship did not occur by chance and is potentially causal, 
hypotheses can be tested, and theories deductively constructed. In this way, logical 
positivism provides a method for gaining an objective knowledge about the world. 
Objectivity through the independence of the scientists is maintained through conformity 
to the following five premises (Mulkay 1975, cited in Johnston 1986: 17–18):
1. Originality – their aim is to advance knowledge by the discovery of new knowledge.
2. Communality – all knowledge is shared, with its provenance fully recognised.
3. Disinterestedness – scientists are interested in knowledge for its own sake, and their 
only reward is the satisfaction that they have advanced understanding.
4. Universalism – judgements are on academic grounds only, and incorporate no 
reflections on the individuals concerned. 
5. Organised scepticism – knowledge is advanced by constructive criticism.
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In contrast to Comte, the Vienna Circle accepted that some statements could be 
verified without recourse to experience, making a distinction between analytical 
statements and synthetic statements. Analytical statements are a priori propositions 
whose truth is guaranteed by their internal definitions (Gregory 1986a). Such analytical 
statements are common in the formal sciences and mathematics, where questions are 
often solved in a purely theoretic form long before they can be empirically tested. 
Indeed, theoretical physics almost exclusively seeks to provide solutions (based on 
known laws and properties) to problems that remain impossible to empirically test (see 
for example Hawking’s A Brief History of Time). Synthetic statements are propositions 
whose truth needs to be established through empirical testing because they lack 
internal definition and are complex. In addition, the Vienna Circle forwarded scientism 
(that is the claim that the positivist method is the only valid and reliable way of 
obtaining knowledge, and all other methods are meaningless because they do not 
produce knowledge that can be verified) and a narrowly defined scientific politics that 
argued that positivism provides the only means of providing rational solutions to all 
problems (Johnston 1986).
Critical rationalism was developed in response to logical positivism and challenges 
its focus on verification. Forwarded by Karl Popper, it contends that the truth of a law 
does not depend on the number of times it is experimentally observed or verified, but 
rather whether it can be falsified (Chalmers 1982). Here it is argued that rather than 
trying to provide a weight of confirmatory evidence, scientific validation should pro-
ceed by identifying exceptions that undermine a theory. If no exceptions can be found 
then a theory can be said to have been corroborated. The critique of such an approach 
is that a theory can never be fully validated as a yet unidentified exception might still 
be awaiting discovery. As a consequence, the approach is difficult to implement except 
in cases of full sample populations and has not been adopted by many geographers 
(Gregory 1986b). A variety of other versions of positivism have been proposed and 
contemporary positivist philosophy significantly extends the work of the Vienna 
Circle. That said, debates in geography draw on these older forms of positivism mainly 
because positivist geography itself rarely engages in any deep or meaningful engage-
ment with philosophy and, as such, its underpinnings have not been advanced with 
regard to new forms of positivism.
Development and Use of Positivism in Human Geography
Positivism is one of the unrecognised, ‘hidden’ philosophical perspectives 
which guides the work of many geographers. … [It remains hidden] in the 
sense that those who adhere to many of its central tenets rarely describe 
themselves as positivists. … While many boldly carry the banner of their 
chosen philosophy, the name of positivism is rarely seen or heard in the 
works of geographers who give assent to its basic principles. (Hill 1981: 43)
Until the 1950s, geography as a discipline was essentially descriptive in nature, examining 
patterns and processes, often on a regional basis, in order to try and understand 
particular places. From the early 1950s, a number of geographers started to argue that 
geographical research needed to become more scientific in its method, seeking the 
underlying laws that explained spatial patterns and processes. For example, Frederick 
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Schaefer (1953: 227), in a paper often cited as the key catalyst for the adoption of 
scientific method in human geography, argued that ‘geography has to be conceived as the 
science concerned with the formulation of the laws governing the spatial distribution of 
certain features on the surface of the earth’. In effect Schaefer drew on the arguments of 
logical positivism to contend that geography should seek to identify laws, challenging the 
exceptionalist claims of geographers such as Hartshorne (1939) that geography and its 
method was unique to that of other social sciences. In other words, geography should 
shift from an ideographic discipline (fact gathering) focusing on regions and places to a 
nomothetic (law producing) science focused on spatial arrangement.
The principal concern of the early advocates of geography as a spatial science was 
that geographical enquiry up to that point was largely unsystematic and analytically 
naïve. Geographers were developing empiricist accounts of the world by simply accu-
mulating facts as evidence for generalist theories. The problem with such empiricist 
endeavours was that they did not distinguish between casual correlations and acciden-
tal or spurious (non-causal) associations. For example, environmental determinist 
accounts suggested that environmental conditions explicitly influenced society in a 
casual fashion (e.g. high ambient temperatures caused underdevelopment in tropical 
countries by inducing idleness among local residents) (Hubbard et al 2002). Moreover, 
such accounts committed ecological fallacies – that is, ascribing aggregate observations 
to all cases within an area. However, just because two things are observed in the same 
place at the same time does not mean that one caused the other or that they apply 
universally. They need to be tested scientifically. Indeed, most people now accept that 
ambient temperature may influence human behaviour but it does not determine it, and 
it has little or no effect on levels of development. For geographers such as Schaefer, 
geography as a discipline would only gain real utility, and by association respectability 
within the academy, if it became more scientific. Scientific method would provide 
validity and credibility to geographic study and it would provide a shared ‘language’ 
for uniting human and physical geography.
The Quantitative Revolution
What followed was the so-called ‘quantitative revolution’, wherein the underlying 
principles and practices of geography transformed (Burton 1963), with description 
replaced with explanation, individual understandings with general laws, and interpre-
tation with prediction (Unwin 1992). In order to employ a scientific method, to trans-
form human geography into a scientific discipline concerned with the identification of 
geographical laws, a number of geographers started to use statistical techniques (par-
ticularly inferential statistics concerned with measuring probability of a relationship 
occurring by chance) to analyse quantitative data. Quantitative data was seen as fac-
tual, objectively and systematically measured. It was therefore universal in nature, free 
of the subjective bias of the measurer and analyst. By statistically analysing and mod-
elling these data, geographers hoped to be able to identify universal laws that would 
explain spatial patterns and processes, and also provide a basis for predicting future 
patterns and identifying ways to constructively intervene in the world (e.g. altering 
policy to engender change). So, just as physics and chemistry tried to determine the 
general laws of the physical world, geographers adopted a naturalist position (a belief 
in the equivalence of method between social and natural sciences) to try to determine 
the spatial laws of human activity. 
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Box 2.1 Spatial models and laws
Throughout the late 1950s and 1960s a whole plethora of geographical models and laws, based on 
scientific analysis of quantitative data and taking the form of mathematical formulae, were developed 
using a hypo-deductive approach. For example, early quantitative geographers tried to find a formula 
that adequately modelled the interaction of people between places. One of these was Isard et al’s 
(1960, detailed in Haggett 1965: 40) inverse-distance gravity model:
Mij = (Pj / dij) .f(Zi)
where Mij is the interaction between centres i and j, Pj is a measure of the mass of centre j, dij is a 
measure of the distance separating them and f(Zi) is a function of Zi, where Zi measures the attractive 
force of destination i. This advanced earlier models that did not take into account how ‘attractive’ each 
location might be in relation to each other (for example, in climate or amenities). 
This transformation in theory and praxis led to a whole variety of different types of 
laws, most of which did not pretend to be the universal law as portrayed by many 
critics. For example, Golledge and Amedeo (1968, summarised in Johnston 1991: 76) 
detailed four types of law being developed in human geography: ‘Cross-sectional laws 
describe functional relationships (as between two maps) but show no causal 
connection, although they may suggest one. Equilibrium laws state what will be 
observed if certain criteria are met. … Dynamic laws incorporate notions of change, 
with the alteration of one variable being followed by (and perhaps causing) an 
alteration in another. … Finally statistical laws … are probability statements of B 
happening, given that A exists’ (the first three laws might be deterministic or statistical). 
The aim, in short, was to create a scientific geography, with the standards of preci-
sion, rigour and accuracy equivalent to other sciences (Wilson 1972). However, as Hill 
(1981) notes, given that spatial science borrowed the idea of scientific method largely 
without conscious reflection on its philosophical underpinnings, it is perhaps better to 
term it positivistic rather than positivist. Certainly, many positivistic geographers (most 
who would prefer to adopt the label of quantitative or statistical geographers) would 
balk at the scientism and scientific politics of logical positivism, though they would see 
the scientific method as the most sensible and robust (rather than the only) approach 
to geographical enquiry. Indeed, the label positivist geography is one that has largely 
been assigned by its critics in recognition of the allegiance of its underpinnings, rather 
than one claimed by its practitioners.
As with all ‘revolutions’, certain key sites and people were instrumental in push-
ing and developing the emerging quantitative geography. In the US, geographers 
such as William Garrison at Washington State, Harold McCarty at Iowa State and 
A.H. Robinson at Wisconsin trained a generation of graduate students who became 
faculty elsewhere, where in turn they propagated their ideas (Johnston 1991). In the 
UK, Peter Haggett at Bristol and later Cambridge was a key influence (along with 
physical geographer Richard Chorley). Indeed, Haggett’s book Locational Analysis 
in Human Geography (1965) was an important text that helped to strengthen the 
case for quantitative geography. Such was the pace of adoption that by 1963 Burton 
had already declared that the revolution was over and quantitative geography was 
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now part of the mainstream. That said, it is important to note that not all geographers 
were enthusiastic converts to what was increasingly called spatial science, and many 
continued to practise and teach other forms of geographical enquiry (Johnston 
1991; Hubbard et al 2002). Nonetheless, the quantitative turn, and its conception 
of space as a geometrical surface on which human relationships are organised and 
played out, did change how many of these geographers conceived the notions of 
space and place.
Harvey’s Explanation in Geography
Despite the rapid growth of quantitative geography throughout the 1960s, as noted, it 
largely operated in a philosophical vacuum – it focused on methodological form, not 
the deeper epistemological structure of knowledge production (Gregory 1978). David 
Harvey’s book Explanation in Geography was a milestone text for the discipline. 
Harvey’s key observation was that until that point geographers had rarely examined 
questions of how and why geographical knowledge was produced. And no-one had 
tried to forward a robust and theoretically rigorous methodological (rather than 
philosophical) base for the discipline. Harvey’s text thus sought to provide such a base 
by explicitly acknowledging the importance of philosophy to geographical enquiry. In 
particular, he drew on the philosophy of science (which can effectively be translated as 
positivism despite the fact that Harvey never uses the term) to construct a theoretically 
sound ontology and epistemology – presented as a coherent scientific methodology. As 
Harvey (1973) himself later acknowledged, however, wider philosophical issues were 
skirted, as his aim was to concentrate on formalising methodology using philosophy 
rather than philosophy per se. 
Spatial Science as Implicit Positivism
While Harvey’s text was enormously influential, providing an initial, theoretically 
robust ontological and epistemological base for spatial science, it is fair to say that 
most geographers employing the scientific method have subsequently paid little atten-
tion to its philosophical underpinnings. As such, as Fotheringham (Chapter 25) notes, 
positivism implicitly underpins much spatial science work, in that while research seeks 
to determine casual relationships and spatial laws through statistical analysis and geo-
graphical modelling, there is little explicit appreciation or engagement with positivism 
or other philosophies. As such, while there is the adoption of a scientific method and 
the use of terms such as law, model, theory and hypothesis, these are often used with-
out an appreciation of what they actually mean or constitute (Hill 1981; Johnston 
1986). Such research forms a major part of the discipline today, despite criticisms 
levelled at its positivistic underpinnings. For example, nearly all GIS and geocomputa-
tional research is practised as spatial science (although it is fair to say that much of it 
has actually continued the tradition of empiricism, wherein facts are allowed to ‘speak 
for themselves’ and are not subject to the rigours of spatial analysis through statistical 
testing – for example, in most mapping work the maps are allowed to speak for them-
selves; it is also increasingly rare to see hypotheses stated and then tested). This is not 
to say that all quantitative geography is implicitly positivist (or empiricist). In fact, 
much is not. Indeed, quantitative geography refers to the geographical inquiry that 
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uses quantitative data, and such data can be interrogated from a number of ontological 
and epistemological positions (it is important never to conflate data type with a philo-
sophical approach). 
Criticism and Challenges to Positivist Geography
The period of transformation in geography’s method opened the way for a sustained 
period of reflection on ontology, epistemology and ideology of geographical inquiry 
from the late 1960s onwards. This coincided with a period of large social unrest in 
many western countries during which many geographers were questioning the rele-
vance and usefulness of the discipline for engaging with and providing practical and 
political solutions. Consequently, numerous geographers started to question the use 
and appropriateness of the scientific method and its new, philosophical base of positiv-
ism from a number of perspectives. It is important to note here that many of these 
critiques were not of using and analysing quantitative data per se, but rather of the 
positivist approach to analysing such data – it was a critique of ontology, epistemology, 
method and ideology, not data type.
The critiques of positivistic geography came from many quarters. For some, such as 
Robert Sack (1980), positivistic geography was a form of spatial fetishism, focusing on 
the spatial at the expense of everything else. Spatial science represented a spatial sepa-
ratist position, decoupling space from time and matter, which he argued meant that it 
had little analytical value – determining spatial patterns would not tell us why such 
patterns exist or why they might change over time because it fails to take account of 
social and political process. 
Marxist and radical critiques developed the latter point. By rejecting issues such 
as politics and religion and trying to explain the world through observable facts, 
radical critics noted that spatial science was limited to certain kinds of questions 
and was further limited in its ability to answer them. It treated people as if they 
were all rational beings devoid of irrationality, ideology and history, who make 
sensible and logical decisions. It therefore modelled the world on the basis that 
people live, or locate their factories and so on, in places that minimise or maximise 
certain economic or social benefits. Critics argued that individuals and society are 
much more complex, with this complexity impossible to capture in simple models 
and laws. As a consequence, Harvey (1973: 128), in a notable turnaround, con-
demned positivistic geography just a few years after writing its ‘blueprint’: there is 
‘a clear disparity between the sophisticated theoretical and methodological frame-
work we are using and our ability to say anything meaningful about events as they 
unfold around us.’ For Harvey, spatial science could say little about issues such as 
class divisions, Third World debt, geopolitical tensions and ecological problems, 
because it was incapable of asking and answering the questions needed to interro-
gate them. Moreover, it was noted that positivistic geography lacked a normative 
function in that it could seek to detail what is and forecast what will be, but gave 
no insight into what should be (Chrisholm 1971). For Harvey and others, the only 
way to address such issues was to turn to radical theories such as Marxism which 
sought to uncover the capitalist structures that underpinned social and economic 
inequalities and regulated everyday life, and to transform such structures into a 
more emancipatory system.
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Accompanying radical critiques, from the early 1970s humanist geographers simi-
larly attacked positivism with regard to its propensity to reduce people to abstract, 
rational subjects and its rejection of metaphysical questions (Buttimer 1976; Guelke 
1974; Tuan 1976). In effect it was argued that spatial science was peopleless, in the 
sense that it did not acknowledge peoples’ beliefs, values, opinions, feelings and so on, 
and their role in shaping everyday geographies. Clearly, individuals are complex beings 
who do not necessarily behave in ways that are easy to model. Humanistic geographers 
thus proposed the adoption of geographical enquiry that was sensitive to capturing the 
complex lives of people through in-depth, qualitative studies.
In addition, both radical and humanist critics questioned the extent to which spatial 
scientists are objective and neutral observers of the world, contending that it is impos-
sible (and in the case of radicals undesirable) to occupy such a position. Geographers, 
it was argued, are participants in the world, with their own personal views and politics, 
not privileged observers who could shed these values while undertaking their research 
(Gregory 1978). At the very least, researchers make decisions over what they study and 
the questions they wish to ask, and these are not value-free choices. 
This argument was supplemented by feminist geographers such as Domosh (1991), 
Rose (1993) and McDowell (1992), who argued that spatial science was underpinned 
by a masculinist rationality. That is, positivism was defined by man’s quest for a god’s-
eye view of the world, one which was universal, ‘orderly, rational, quantifiable, predict-
able, abstract, and theoretical’ (Stanley and Wise 1993: 66), and in which the knower 
‘can separate himself from his body, emotions, values, past and so on, so that he and 
his thought are autonomous, context-free and objective’ (Rose 1993: 7). They argued 
that geographical enquiry had to reject such rationality and become much more sensi-
tive to power relations within the research process, and the geographer more self-
reflexive of their positionality, supposed expertise, and influence on the production of 
knowledge. In other words, geographers had to give up the pretence that they could 
necessarily create a master, universal knowledge of the world and accept that knowl-
edge will always be partial and situated (from a certain perspective). What this meant 
in practice was that feminist geographers largely dismissed quantitative geography as 
a viable means of feminist praxis. 
In turn, this feminist critique opened the door to a wider debate on the relationship 
between feminism epistemology and spatial science in a special forum of Professional 
Geographer (1994: Should women count?), which in turn helped (alongside texts such 
as Pickles 1995) to fuel the development of critical approaches to GIS in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s. Critical GIScience draws off feminist, postmodern and poststructural-
ist theories to rethink the modus operandi of spatial science (see Curry 1998, Kwan 
2002, Harvey 2003). In many senses it is an attempt to reposition quantitative geogra-
phy by providing it with a radically different philosophical framework to positivism, 
one that is more contemporary and robust to traditional criticisms of spatial science and 
which enables it to address questions that previously it avoided or was unable to tackle.
Positivist geography today
Despite the criticism levelled at geographical work underpinned by positivist reasoning, 
implicit positivism remains strong within human geography. A very large number of 
geographers argue that they are scientists, employ scientific principles and reasoning, 
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and seek laws or mathematical models that purport to explain the geographical world. 
Many, as Stewart Fotheringham notes in his chapter, give little thought to the philo-
sophical underpinnings of their scientific method and are not interested in philosophical 
debate and critique, shaking their heads in frustration and disbelief at ongoing philo-
sophical discussions and ‘wondering what is happening to the rest of their discipline’. 
Of course, much of the rest of the discipline are shaking their collective heads at the 
philosophical naivety of spatial scientists. Questions around what geographers should 
study, how they should study it, and for whom are important because they define the 
discipline and its praxis – philosophy is a core, inescapable feature of geographic 
research (see Hill 1981, Hubbard et al 2002). To ignore such questions, or to take them 
as self-evident, means that implicitly positivistic geography has weak and unstable 
underpinnings (much of it backsliding into empiricism) and leaves it vulnerable to cri-
tique for which it has little response. To simply argue that those who criticise positivis-
tic geography do not understand its bases, or lack the required skill to practise and 
therefore understand it, or are damaging the discipline by engaging with wider philo-
sophical debate is a weak and deflective response that fails to tackle any of the criticism 
levelled at it. 
This is not to say that all spatial science lacks theory; rather, much of it lacks a 
fundamental and robust ontological, epistemological and ideological base. It also does 
not mean that their work is not useful or valuable; it most patently is or it would not 
be practised, commissioned or used by policy makers and business. However, by ignor-
ing wider philosophical debate spatial scientists often fail to make a robust case for 
their approach to new generations of geographers, who are often seduced by the criti-
cisms levelled at positivism and quantification more broadly (and this will continue to 
be the case unless addressed). Instead they rely on the commercial and policy cache of 
GIS to make implicitly positivistic geography sustainable. As the debates in GIScience 
illustrate, however, the implicit positivism underpinning GIS use is open to challenge, 
with an acknowledgement that the employment of the scientific method can be prac-
tised from more critical perspectives. 
That said, despite critique and its seeming shrinkage in importance in the discipline, 
the future of positivistic science seems relatively assured. Just as GIS gave fresh impetus 
to spatial science in the 1990s, new technological developments seem set to provide a 
significant boost to its fortunes in the present decade. Over the past few years a data 
revolution has been taking place that has now reached a tipping point: we have entered 
the age of ‘big data’. Big data involves enormous, dynamic, interconnected digital data-
sets relating to people, objects, interactions, transactions and territories. Big data is 
commonly characterised as being large in volume, high in velocity (in real-time) and 
wide in variety (with the majority of the data unstructured in form – text, images, audio, 
rather than simply numbers) (Laney 2001; Zikopoulos et al 2012). It is also relational 
(linked to other data) and has a fine granularity (related to individual people, objects, 
transactions as opposed to being aggregated). Ever more data are being produced by 
software-enabled technologies such as computers, digital cameras and smartphones, as 
well as sensors and processors embedded in buildings, vehicles, and environments; non-
digital objects are being made machine-readable through devices that can scan various 
kinds of barcodes and radio frequency identifiers; social media users are generating 
massive volumes of volunteered information through exchanges such as Facebook or 
Twitter posts, as well as through online searches, browsing sites or purchasing goods 
and services (Kitchin and Dodge 2011). Every interaction and transaction that utilises 
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software and ICT generates data. Importantly for geographical analysis, much of this 
data is georeferenced, referring to particular places or located in space through the GPS 
traces of mobile devices (Goodchild 2007). Moreover, the data are generated in real 
time. The result is data that can provide very detailed views of large systems in flux and 
can potentially enable sophisticated spatio-temporal modelling. 
The scale, timeliness and variety of the data now being produced is startling and is 
growing rapidly. For example, Gantz and Reinsel (2011) estimated that the ‘amount of 
information created and replicated on the Internet will surpass 1.8 zettabytes (1.8 tril-
lion gigabytes)’ in 2011 stored in ‘500 quadrillion files ... growing by a factor of 9 in 
just five years’ and ‘more than doubling every two years’. They predict that in the next 
decade, ‘the number of servers (virtual and physical) worldwide will grow by a factor 
of 10, the amount of information managed by enterprise datacenters will grow by a 
factor of 50, and the number of files the datacenter will have to deal with will grow 
by a factor of 75, at least’.
The challenge is to analyse and extract value from these massive, dynamic and var-
ied datasets. For some, the approach required is quite empiricist. For example, Chris 
Anderson (2008), Editor in Chief at Wired magazine, has declared that big data signals 
‘the end of theory’, arguing that ‘the data deluge makes the scientific method obsolete’. 
Anderson’s argument is that big data inherently speak for themselves, producing mean-
ingful and insightful knowledge about social, political and economic processes and 
complex phenomena; that all that is required to provide such insights is sophisticated 
data management, mining and correlation analytics that can reveal patterns and make 
sense of the data deluge. He concludes:
Petabytes allow us to say: ‘Correlation is enough.’ We can stop looking for 
models. We can analyze the data without hypotheses about what it might 
show. We can throw the numbers into the biggest computing clusters the 
world has ever seen and let statistical algorithms find patterns where sci-
ence cannot. ... Correlation supersedes causation, and science can advance 
even without coherent models, unified theories, or really any mechanistic 
explanation at all. There’s no reason to cling to our old ways.
Similarly, Prensky (2009, original emphasis) argues: ‘scientists no longer have to make 
educated guesses, construct hypotheses and models, and test them with data-based 
experiments and examples. Instead, they can mine the complete set of data for patterns that 
reveal effects, producing scientific conclusions without further experimentation.’ In essence, 
Anderson and Prensky are contending that the analysis of big data can float free of theory, 
with the weight of evidence, revealed through data analytics, providing deep insight into the 
world. Under this scenario, what might transpire in the long term is the continuation of spatial 
science as implicitly positivist at best, and implicitly empiricist at worst.
What such reasoning fails to appreciate is that the algorithms underpinning data 
analytics are based on scientific reasoning and are refined through scientific testing – 
and that science is laden with ontological and epistemological assumptions, as with 
any other science, including empiricism. In other words, data analytics do not arise 
from nowhere or within a scientific vacuum; rather, they arise from science method, 
and this method is predominately positivist in its formulation. 
In contrast to those promoting data analytics shorn of scientific method are those 
who argue that big data will usher in a new phase of computational social science that 
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analyses data which has enormous breadth, depth, scale and timeliness and is inher-
ently longitudinal, rather than the much smaller, one-time, snap-shot datasets that 
characterise existing quantitative data sets and qualitative research (Lazer et al., 2009). 
Here, big data presents untold possibilities for a new wave of positivistic models that 
address some of the critiques levelled at it previously: the data are finely granulated 
and much more exhaustive, algorithms and models are much more refined and sensi-
tive to context and contingency, and computation is so powerful that it is possible to 
produce highly sophisticated spatio-temporal models of social and environmental 
processes and, given the size and range of the data sets, it is possible to more quickly 
hone hypotheses and be confident in their veracity. Such data-intensive science will 
enable geographers to analyse bigger and more complex systems more efficiently and 
effectively and to advance an understanding of society rooted in analysis underpinned 
by the scientific method. Such an approach is implicitly positivist in its underpinnings. 
The emergence of big data and computational social science thus has the potential to 
breathe new life into quantitative geography and positivistic forms of geographical 
analysis. 
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